Carlo Marletti
Sellars, Kant e il 'molteplice del senso'

The theoretical background to my paper is that, in Sellars’ opinion, the return to Kant in order to gain a better understanding of intentionality is only admissible if caution is used both towards the myth of the given and towards the autonomy of the conceptual. In Marletti [2001] I argued against McDowell’s position in favour of the reasons of sensibility that emerge from Sellars’ criticism of the myth of the given and from his reading of Kant. This work is instead dedicated to showing that, unlike recent neo-Hegelian readings of Sellars, Sellarsian interpretation of the Kantian themes of intuition and "manifold of sense" reveals a radically cautious position towards the autonomy of the conceptual. Finally, starting from a curious paradox in Sellarsian analysis of aristotelian abstractionism, I underline the non-reductionist philosophical potential contained in Sellars’ theoretical position towards the alignment of intuitions and concepts.